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Abstract 
 
Advances in communication technology have led to a remarkable increase in the tradability of 
services, resulting in a substantial increase in offshoring of services over the last two 
decades. Research investigating how this surge in service offshoring affects employment, 
has been largely hampered by the paucity of suitable microdata. This paper tries to fill this 
gap by using a newly constructed database of Belgian firms that combines individual 
transaction-level data on international trade in goods and services with annual financial 
accounts. This unusually rich dataset allows us to produce fresh evidence on the impact of 
goods and service offshoring on total employment and employment by educational levels for 
both manufacturing industries and the service sectors. Our results show that: (i) goods 
offshoring has a positive impact on employment growth among workers with both low and 
high levels of education in the manufacturing industry but this effect disappears when 
controlling for scale effects; and (ii) service offshoring has a negative impact on employment 
growth among highly educated workers in the service sectors. This novel evidence suggests 
that globalization may threaten job security of higher educated workers too. 
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I. Introduction
The impact of globalisation on domestic labour markets has been debated
among academics for several years and, recently, has taken centre stage in the
political debate in various developed countries, most recently in the 2016 US
election campaign. The relocation of jobs abroad by domestically active firms is
generally considered one of the culprits for the decline in employment in devel-
oped economies’ manufacturing industries as well as for the worse labour market
outcomes of unskilled workers. Given that unskilled jobs are more easily moved
offshore to developing countries that have a comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of unskilled labour-intensive goods, globalisation can lower the relative
demand for unskilled workers in developed countries, thereby contributing to in-
creased wage inequality in Western economies. While trade was originally found
to explain only a small part of the observed changes in wage inequality, the intro-
duction of offshoring – the disintegration of the production process across national
borders – in theoretical and empirical work has shown that globalisation accounts
for a substantial part of the rise in wage inequality (Krugman, 2008; Feenstra and
Hanson, 2003).
Because of continuous advances in information and communication technology,
services have also become increasingly tradable. Although the level of inter-
national trade in services is still relatively small, the growth in services trade
substantially outperforms the growth in goods trade. This evolution has led gov-
ernments to start new trade negotiations that can reflect the reality of increasingly
service-based international commerce; for instance, several members of the WTO
are currently negotiating the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) with the aim of
facilitating market access and improving rules in areas such as licensing, telecom-
munications, e-commerce and financial services. While most economists believe
that opening up markets for services leads to economic growth, increasing trad-
ability also means that a large number of jobs previously insulated from foreign
competition may potentially be located abroad (Blinder, 2006), thus leading to
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what Amiti and Wei (2005) call the “fear of service offshoring.”
When a firm relocates part of its production process abroad, one would expect a
direct negative effect on firm employment, the magnitude of which depends on the
number of in-house workers that are attached to the offshored process. However,
offshoring may also lead to productivity gains and product quality improvements
that can boost firms’ output growth and employment (Wright, 2014). Because
the question of which of the two effects dominates is an empirical one, the aim
of this paper is to produce fresh empirical evidence on the impact of offshoring
on employment outcomes. More precisely, we use a rich dataset of Belgian firms
to investigate the effects of both goods and service offshoring on total labour
demand, as well as on relative labour demand for skilled and unskilled workers in
the manufacturing and services sectors.
Most of the academic literature on the labour market effects of trade has fo-
cused on the relative demand for unskilled labour, while studies on the absolute
change in employment are less common. This may reflect modelling conventions
that impose inelastic labour supply and abstract from labour market frictions.
As a result, workers losing their jobs in firms/sectors because of increased global-
isation would simply be relocated to other firms/sectors (Acemoglu et al., 2014).
However, with (labour) market imperfections, there is no guarantee that such
perfect relocation would occur. For example, Autor et al. (2013); Acemoglu et
al. (2014) and Pierce and Schott (2016) find that import competition from China
has been a major force behind employment reductions in the US manufacturing
sector. Moreover, the import competition has depressed overall job growth in the
US, indicating imperfect relocation.
Most of the studies on the impact of offshoring on labour have focused on
offshoring of goods, initially using industry-level data (see, for example, Feenstra
and Hanson, 1999) and more recently using firm-level data (e.g., Mion and Zhu,
2013). The general consensus in this literature is that the relative demand for
unskilled workers falls in response to goods offshoring. However, the findings from
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studies investigating the effects on absolute employment are mixed, with most
of them estimating rather small effects of offshoring on domestic employment,
whether positive or negative (Wright, 2014). In a recent article, Monarch et al.
(2017) study several offshoring events by matching Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) program petition data to U.S. Census Bureau microdata. They find that
offshoring firms experience a significant decline in employment in the year when
offshoring starts and in the following 4 years after the event. They also show that
there is no evidence of employment recovery in the longer run.
Compared to the large empirical and theoretical literature on trade in goods,
our understanding of trade in services and its impact is still hampered by the
paucity of suitable microdata. Given that service tasks are, on average, more
skill-intensive than production tasks, economic intuition would suggest that ser-
vice offshoring should exert a downward pressure on skilled labour demand (Crino,
2009). But the few available empirical studies have found no support for this hy-
pothesis. On the contrary, service offshoring seems to increase relative demand
for skilled workers (Crino, 2010b,a, 2012), mimicking the findings for goods off-
shoring in earlier studies. But Crino (2012) shows that this similarity between
service and goods is actually driven by two different forces: complementarity be-
tween imported services and domestic skills in the case of service offshoring and
substitution of low-skilled labour in the case of material offshoring. Similarly,
Geishecker and Go¨rg (2013) combine individual-level data on wages with sector-
level data on service offshoring and find that service offshoring negatively affects
the real wage of low-and medium-skilled individuals in the same industry, while
skilled workers benefit from service offshoring through higher real wages. Using a
panel of Swedish manufacturing firms, Andersson et al. (2016) also finds that ser-
vice offshoring increases relative demand for skilled labour while goods offshoring
appears to have no impact.
The number of studies that investigate the effective impact of service offshoring
on total labour demand is even more limited. Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) use
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sector-level data for UK and US manufacturing, respectively. They find a small
negative or no effect of service offshoring on labour demand in the US, but a
small positive effect in the UK. Go¨rg and Hanley (2005) uses a panel of 100 Irish
electronic firms and find some negative effects of service offshoring on employment,
but smaller in magnitude than those of goods offshoring. Using data on imports
and exports of service retrieved from a survey of UK firms, Hijzen et al. (2011)
find that employment growth in firms that import services, is higher than in
firms that do not. The results appear to be driven by cost savings associated
with offshoring that give rise to an increase in the scale of production.1
We aim to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we in-
vestigate the relationship between employment outcomes and the offshoring of
both goods and services. The number of studies measuring the effects of service
offshoring is still limited, and they use mostly aggregated sector-level data or are
based on surveys of a sample of firms. In contrast, we can observe firm-level
imports of both goods and services. Second, we incorporate the services sec-
tors in our analysis. Although the bulk of employment is located in the services
sectors, most of the empirical work focuses solely on manufacturing industries,
largely because of data constraints. This is particularly important for our re-
search question, as most of the activity in service offshoring takes place in the
services sectors. Third, we look at both the impact on the change in total em-
ployment and the effect on workers with different education levels. Finally, our
econometric framework will allow us to disentangle substitution and scale effects,
as well as short-run effects versus the impact over a longer period. In principle,
purchasing an input from abroad implies the immediate replacement of a task
previously done by domestic workers employed either by the importing firms or
by a domestic supplier of that firm. However, the purchase of foreign inputs may
1Another strand of the literature has investigated the impact of globalisation decisions on firm
performance. Amiti and Konings (2007) show how the imports of intermediate products lead to higher
productivity. Similarly, Halpern et al. (2011) provide evidence that the access to new intermediate
goods varieties is an important source of productivity growth. Goldberg et al. (2010) find that access to
foreign imports increases firm product scope and that this can lead to an increase in the market shares of
offshoring firms, thus mitigating or even offsetting the initial negative effect of offshoring on employment.
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later lead to productivity gains and quality improvements that allow the firm to
expand output and employment (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).
Our findings indicate that goods and service offshoring have different effects
on employment growth. Employment growth is positively related to goods off-
shoring in the manufacturing sector. However, when controlling for scale effects,
this relation becomes either non-statistically different from zero or even negative,
depending on the specification. Service offshoring is negatively related to employ-
ment growth in the services sector, and interestingly enough, this result appears
to be driven by employees with high education. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper to find robust large-scale evidence that in the services sectors,
it is the job security of skilled workers that globalisation threatens. This finding
is compatible with the fact that most of service imports come from other OECD
countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the dataset
used for the analysis. Section III explains the empirical methodology and the
construction of the instrumental variables used to identify the causal impact of
offshoring on employment. Section IV presents the results, and section V con-
cludes.
II. Data
For our empirical analysis, we rely on Belgian firms’ annual accounts which
are merged with data on their trading activities for the period 1996-2005.2 The
annual accounts contain the standard variables, such as employment, value added,
turnover and book value of tangible assets.3 While all limited-liability firms
2We restrict the analysis to the period 1996-2005 for two reasons. First, the definition of employment
in the annual accounts has changed in 1996. Since many firms still reported employment according to
the old reporting standard, the data for 1995 are not always reliable, hence we drop this year from the
sample. Second, trade in services is available for the full population only until 2005. Until 2005, the
data were constructed using transaction data on cross-border payments to foreign enterprises reported
by financial institutions, implying that data were available for the full population of firms. Starting in
2006, data are collected directly from a sample of (large) firms, resulting in a structural break in the
series. Therefore, we include only data until 2005 in our sample.
3For a limited number of firms, the reporting year does not run from January to December. To
correct for these, we follow a procedure suggested by the National Bank of Belgium to annualize these
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are required to report their annual accounts to the National Bank of Belgium,
reporting requirements are limited for small firms.4 Since some of the variables
used in the empirical analysis, such as turnover and job flows by education levels,
are available only for firms that report complete annual accounts, we limit our
attention to these (larger) firms.
We obtained data on trade in goods from the National Bank of Belgium (NBB).
We observe for each firm in a given year its imports and exports at the product-
country level, where products are defined according to the Combined Nomencla-
ture (CN8) classification. Data on intra-EU imports and exports of goods are
subject to reporting cutoffs that have changed over time. Specifically, from 1995
to 1997, firms had to report intra-EU exports (imports) if their value in the pre-
vious year exceeded e104,115. Between 1998 to 2005, this threshold increased to
e250,000 per year. Moreover, the change in EU membership in 2004 implicitly in-
creased the number of countries included in intra-EU declarations. For extra-EU
trade flows, data are collected from customs data. All transactions for which the
value is higher than e1,000 or whose weight is over 1,000Kg have to be recorded.
The international trade in services data for Belgium are collected on the basis of
the balance of payment returns sent to the NBB either by commercial banks or by
direct reporters.5 Between 1995 and 2005, banks had to report payments made or
received by their clients when the payer or the payee was a non-resident. Data are
available at the firm-service-country-year level. Starting with the NACE rev1.1
accounts.
4Firms are considered small if they do not exceed more than one of three criteria: 1)employment
higher than 50; 2) balance sheet total exceeding e3.65 million; and 3)turnover higher than e7.3 million.
5Trade in services is usually classified in four different modes (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Mode
1 is cross-border supply and applies when service suppliers located in one country provide services in
another country without either the buyer or the supplier moving to the physical location of the other.
A typical example is a call center located in India that provides services to a Belgian firm. Mode 2
is consumption abroad and applies when the service is consumed by a resident of one country in the
territory of another country–e.g., hotel services to tourists. Mode 3 refers to commercial presence–i.e.
firms moving to the location of the consumers to provide their services locally through the establishment
of a foreign affiliate or branch. Mode 4 is the movement of natural persons and refers to services provided
by the firm of one country through the presence of natural persons in another country–for example, a
Polish transport company that offers transport services in Belgium through the presence of its trucker in
Belgium. Since the data for Belgium are constructed using financial transaction data involving foreign
businesses and Belgian residents, mode 3 is not included, as there is no cross-border payment involved
in this mode of service trade.
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classification used by the NBB, we divide services into seven different groups:
Transport, Financial and Insurance, Communication, Information Technologies,
(other) Business, Construction and Cultural Services.6 In our empirical analysis,
we exclude construction and cultural services.
In constructing our dataset, we limit attention to transactions involving Belgian
firms, thus excluding for example spending by Belgian tourists abroad. We also
exclude the following transactions: 1) transactions in goods that did not involve a
change in ownership; 2) payments of royalties and license fees and financial flows
between related companies since these could reflect profit shifting for tax reasons;
3) all merchanting transactions related to trade in goods and 4) payments made
by governments or international institutions.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of trade in goods and trade in services in nominal
values. The growth in trade of services is higher than that for goods over the
time window considered. As shown in Appendix VII.B, this increase is even more
pronounced for services such as Business Services, (+254% increase in nominal
value of imports), IT Services (+271%) and Communication Services (+340%),
compared to an average of +110% for trade in goods. However, in level terms,
imports of services still represent only around 10% of the value of imports of
goods at the end of our sample period.7
To convert the data into real values, we use deflators from the EUKLEMS
database. The international trade data – both services and goods – are deflated
with the output deflator corresponding to the NACE code of the trade flow.8
Firms’ turnover, material inputs and value added reported in the annual account
dataset are deflated with the deflators for output, material and value added,
respectively. To convert tangible and intangible fixed assets into real values, we
6The NACE rev1.1 classification translates one-to-one into the international classification of services
EBOPS. Table A.1 in Appendix VII.A shows the EBOPS classification and the correpsonding NACE
codes.
7The coverage of the international trade in services is much smaller as banks are not included in the
annual report database.
8For trade in goods, CN8 products are translated into NACE categories using an appropriate corre-
spondence table. Manufacturing firms are firms active in NACE rev 1.1 sectors 15 to 36. The services
sector consists of NACE rev 1.1 codes 60 to 74.
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apply the capital deflator reported by Eurostat for Belgium in the appropriate
year. Finally, we use the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) to deflate
wages.
After some cleaning of the data,9 the final sample that we use in our empirical
analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of 3751 manufacturing firms and 3679
service firms for the period 1996 to 2005. Table 1 displays total imports of the
different types of services for this final sample.10 Services imports have increased
by more than imports of goods, mostly due to the boom in business, IT and
communication services. Although the sample consists of large firms, only a
minority imports services, but the share of firms importing services has increased
from 28.2% to 38.8% over the sample period. The share of firms that imports
goods is substantially higher, at more than 50% (and over 80% if we consider only
firms in the manufacturing sector). These large numbers reflect the Belgium’s
substantial trade openness as well as the fact that we focus on large firms.
We define offshoring of goods and services as the firm-level imports of goods
and services, respectively. In the empirical section we check the robustness of our
results using the following alternative definitions of offshoring: (a) “narrow goods
offshoring” defined as the purchases of inputs classified in the same NACE2 man-
ufacturing industry of the firm and, similarly, “core service offshoring” defined as
acquired services that belong to the same group classification discussed previously
(see last column of Table A.1 in the Appendix); and (b) offshoring from OECD
and non-OECD countries.
In Figure 2, we plot the average ratio between firm-level offshoring and to-
tal expenditures on material and service inputs for each NACE 2-digit sector.
Offshoring of goods and of services are shown in light-grey and dark-grey, re-
9We drop observations where (i) the share of offshoring–i.e., the ratio between offshoring of goods
and services and turnover, is above one; and (ii) the absolute change in the share of offshoring over
two consecutive years is above 0.5. Furthermore, we winsorize the growth of employment and share of
offshoring at the 1st and 99th percentile.
10The relative importance of each service category is comparable to the full dataset. Only the Fi-
nancial and Insurance Services imports are of relatively lower importance in comparison to the figures
in Table B.1, which show the importance of the different types of services in the trade database. This is
because banks are not included in the firm-level dataset.
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spectively. Several sectors in the manufacturing compartment are found to im-
port more than 20% of their intermediary inputs. Not surprisingly, offshoring
of intermediate inputs is mostly prevalent in the manufacturing industries, while
offshoring of service inputs is more common in service sectors. Total offshoring
is higher in manufacturing industries, reflecting higher tradability of goods in
comparison with services.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for some of the key variables used in the
empirical analysis. The average firm in the manufacturing sector employs 153
people and generates 45 million euro in revenues. The share of offshoring of
goods, defined as the ratio between offshoring and turnover, is almost 20%, while
the corresponding share for services is around 0.5%. Average employment growth
is very low and equal to 0.45%. The average firm active in the services sector
employs around 156 people, with a turnover of almost 22 million euro. In general,
total imports as a percentage of turnover is relatively low compared to the man-
ufacturing sector, but imports of services are much more important and equal
to 3.3%. Average employment growth is equal to 3.6%, reflecting the aggregate
pattern of increasing importance of the services sector.
Growth of Education. — Our data also report the inflow and outflow of em-
ployees (but not their total stock) by education level. The employees are divided
into 4 categories: (1) primary education or lower; (2) secondary education; (3)
higher education, non-university; and (4) university education. We collapse these
four categories into two education levels: low education (categories 1 and 2) and
high education (categories 3 and 4). To gain insight into the relative importance
of workers with low (L) and high (H) education in the manufacturing and services
sectors, we compute the share of group j=L,H in the total gross flow of employ-
ees as Sharej = Inflow
j+Outflowj∑
j=L,H
(Inflowj+Outflowj
), and we find that employees with high
education account for 40% of total gross flows in the service sector, compared to
a much lower 20% in the manufacturing sector.
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To compute the growth rate of employment by education level, we use the
following procedure. First, we use the observed net flow of employment ∆N jit =
Inflowj−Outflowj in education group j to compute the corresponding net flows
in total employment, ∆Nit =
∑
j=L,H
∆N jit. Second, we compute the difference
between ∆Nit and the change in total average number of employees ∆Eit,
11 and
we add this difference to the net flows of low-education or high-education workers
proportional to their share in the sum of the absolute values of these net flows.
For example, suppose that ∆E is equal to 2, ∆NL equal to -8 and ∆NH equal
to 4, resulting in ∆N being equal to -4. The difference between ∆E and ∆N
is, thus, equal to 6. The share of low-(high-) skilled workers in the total flow is
8
8+4 =
2
3 (respectively,
1
3). The adjusted flows are then ∆E
L = −8+ 236 = −4 and
∆EH = 4 + 136 = 6. Finally, we use the adjusted flows ∆E
j in each education
group to compute the growth rate of employment by education levels as ∆ejit =
∆Ejit
0.5(Eit−1+Eit) .
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III. Empirical Framework and Instruments
A. Framework
The specification we take to the data consists in regressing the growth of em-
ployment, ∆eit, on time-varying firm-level measures of share of offshoring for
goods, SOgit, and services, SO
s
it, measured as imported goods or imported services
over total turnover.13 We define the dependent variable as growth rates because,
as explained above, we observe changes in employment (but not employment lev-
els) for different education levels. We use measures of offshoring scaled by firm
size to eliminate the possibility of finding a positive (or negative) correlation be-
11The difference between ∆N and ∆E may be due to two reasons. First, ∆N refers to the difference
between employment at the end of year t and employment at the end of year t−1, while ∆E refers to the
change in average employment during the year. Second, there could be measurement error in reporting
the flows by education levels.
12Following the notation just introduced, in the rest of the paper, we use ∆x to indicate the percentage
change (i.e. growth rate) of variables X and ∆X to indicate the difference between the levels of X over
two consecutive years.
13See also Bernard et al. (2006) and Mion and Zhu (2013) for similar approaches
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tween imports and employment due to exogenous positive (respectively, negative)
shocks in demand or productivity that cause a proportional increase (decrease) in
both output and variable inputs: for instance, the award of a public procurement
contract that leads to a simultaneous increase in output and imported inputs but
that leaves the share of offshoring unchanged.
To capture differences between the immediate impact of offshoring and the
effects over a longer period, we start with the following specification:
(1) eit = β1eit−1 + β2SO
g
it + β3SO
g
it−1 + β4SO
s
it + β5SO
s
it−1 + ηi + εit,
where ηi is the firm unobserved productivity assumed to be constant over the time
window considered and εit captures shocks to employment, possibly correlated
with the offshoring activities, and measurement errors. Subtracting eit−1 on both
sides of the equation and subtracting and adding β2SO
g
it−1 and β4SO
s
it−1 on the
RHS, we obtain:
∆eit = (β1 − 1)eit−1 + β2∆SOgit + (β2 + β3)SOgit−1
+β4∆SO
s
it + (β4 + β5)SO
s
it−1 + ηi + εit,
(2)
where ∆SOgit (∆SO
s
it) indicates the difference in the share of goods (respectively,
service) offshoring over two consecutive years. The coefficients on ∆SOit measure
the short-run effect of goods or service offshoring, while the coefficients on SOit−1
capture the effect over a longer (two-year) period.
The main specification we take to the data controls for labour productivity,
LP , capital intensity, KI, and log of wages, w, all of which also enter as lagged
levels and yearly changes.14 Accordingly:
(3) ∆eit = αeit−1 + SOitβ + Vitγ + ηi + εit,
14LP is defined as log(value added/number of employees) while KI is log(physical capital/number of
employees). Note that w refers to the log of wages.
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where α ≡ {β1 − 1}, the vector SOit ≡ {SOgit−1,∆SOgit, SOsit−1,∆SOsit} and
the vector Vit ≡ {∆LPit, LPit−1,∆KIit,KIit−1,∆wit, wit−1}. The specification
above is estimated using firm-level fixed effects to control for productivity differ-
ences and any unobserved heterogeneity across firms.
Offshoring can affect labour in two ways. First, it can reduce the amount of
employment to the extent that imported inputs replace a task previously done
in-house. However, product improvements and efficiency gains due to the use of
(new and better) imported inputs may have an expansion effect on firms’ output
and employment. In order to identify the complementarity or substitutability of
offshoring with respect to labour, net of sales expansion due to rising productivity
and increased demand, we will also estimate the specification above adding lagged
log of output and growth of output in real terms as extra control variables:
(4) ∆eit = αeit−1 + SOitβ + Vitγ + Qitδ + ηi + εit,
where Qit ≡ {qit−1,∆qit}.15 Hummels et al. (2014) use a similar approach to
estimate the direct and aggregate (i.e., including productivity gains) effect of
goods offshoring on wages in Denmark. But while Hummels et al. (2014) use levels
of offshoring, we scale trade variables by firm size to eliminate the correlation in
employment and imports that is unrelated to the offshoring decision.
B. Instruments
The key identification challenge we face in our empirical exercise is that pro-
ductivity shocks and changes in the demand for the firms’ products are likely to
simultaneously affect employment and offshoring. For instance, there is undis-
puted evidence that highly productive firms are larger, export more products and
import more inputs. Our specification tries to minimize these sources of endo-
geneity by including a rather rich set of control variables capturing the impact of
15Note that q is the log of real output Q.
12
technological changes, capital deepening and the cost of labour on employment.
Nevertheless, estimating equation (3) with Ordinary Least Squares or FE may
still result in biased parameter estimates if there are unobserved productivity
changes and demand shocks that affect firms’ offshoring intensity as well as their
labour demand. Thus, we need to find firm-time varying instruments that are
correlated with imports at the firm level but uncorrelated with labour demand.
To construct the instruments, we combine the firm-level trade structure in a
base year with factors at the product-country level affecting the propensity to
import (see, also, Hummels et al., 2014 for a similar approach). More precisely,
our firm-time varying instrument Zit for firm i in period t is constructed as Zit =∑
c,k sickIckt, where sick represents the share of imports of product k from country
c by firm i in the base year–i.e., the pre-sample year or the first year that the
firm enters the sample. The other component of the instrument Ickt consists of
factors affecting or reflecting changes in comparative advantage of country c in
the production of product k. These include exchange rates, inflation, and world
export supply in goods and services. These factors are discussed in more detail
in subsequent sections.
Exchange rates. — The exchange rate between country c and Belgium in period
t affects the costs of importing in euros (or in the Belgian franc for the period
before 1999), thus affecting the offshoring intensity of Belgian firms from that
country. However, the exchange rate itself is not related to the employment
outcome of specific Belgian firms, making it a valid instrument. We obtained
exchange rates from the International Financial Statistics database published
by the IMF. Note that the exchange rates have only country-time variation, no
product variation.
Inflation rates and Wages. — If inflation or wages in country c are higher than
in Belgium, the imported products/services become more expensive, altering the
13
optimal amount of imports. At the same time, these variables can be consid-
ered exogenous to the employment outcome of individual Belgian firms. As for
the exchange rates, we obtained inflation rates from the International Financial
Statistics Dataset, and they have country-time variation. Data on wages, were
retrieved from the STructural ANalysis (STAN) database produced by the OECD
and have a country-industry-time variation.
Trade in Goods. — We follow Hummels et al. (2014) and construct so-called
World Export Supply (WES), which is equal to total exports of product k by
country c net of exports of product k by country c to Belgium. The idea is that
WES captures changes in comparative advantage for the exporting country, aris-
ing from changes in the production price, product quality or variety. Subtracting
the exports to Belgium from the total exports makes ensures that Belgian demand
factors are filtered out of the instrument. For bilateral trade flows, we rely on the
BACI dataset (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010), which is based on the COMTRADE
dataset.16 From this database we can construct WES at the HS6 digit-year-
country level.17 Other studies use variation in tariffs to construct a similar in-
strument. We experimented with tariffs from the UNCTAD Trains database, but
the tariff instruments had little explanatory power in the first-stage regressions,
probably due to the little variation in tariffs over the sample period.
Trade in Services. — We construct a similar measure for World Export Supply,
but for trade in services. Unfortunately, bilateral trade flows of services are not
as detailed as those for trade in goods. The WTO reports trade in services,
but only exports to the world for each country (and not bilateral trade flows).
Therefore, we can not control for the exports to Belgium. However, given that
16The BACI dataset makes corrections to COMTRADE based on the observation that the reported
imports of country j from country c should be the same as the reported exports of country c to country
j, after taking into account that import values are reported CIF (cost, insurance and freight) and export
values are reported FOB (free on board).
17To control for HS6 codes changing over time, we follow the concordance procedure explained in Van
Beveren et al. (2012).
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Belgium is a small country, it is unlikely to affect the aggregate export patterns of
the partner countries. Note that the product level is very coarse however, as we
can only separately observe exports of commercial services and transport services
throughout the sample period.
The different variables described above have country-time or country-time-
industry variation. As mentioned above, we obtain firm-year level instruments
by taking a weighted sum of these factors with the share of the import value of
product k from country c by firm i in the base year as weight. The idea is that a
firm i that sources a particular input k from country c is likely to keep on buying
this input k from country c over a long period of time because, for example, the
product is a particularly good fit for the firm or because there are fixed costs as-
sociated with switching countries to buy the inputs (Hummels et al., 2014). Over
time, the exporting country’s comparative advantage in a product can change,
and these changes will affect the supply decisions of firms already importing from
this country more than other firms.
In the empirical specification, we use the exchange rate, trade in goods and
wages as instruments for offshoring of goods, and the exchange rate, trade in
services and inflation for offshoring of services. Econometric tests reported in
the following section confirm that our instruments are highly correlated with the
import share while being orthogonal to the changes in firm level employment.
IV. Results
Before investigating the impact of offshoring on employment, we start exploring
the relationship among total employment, national intermediary inputs, and off-
shoring. More precisely, we regress the growth rate of employment on the growth
rate of the other inputs–namely, domestically purchased18 and imported inputs:
18Domestically purchased inputs are obtained by subtracting firm level imports, excluding imports of
capital goods according to the BEC classification, from total reported spending on intermediate goods
and services.
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∆eit = βm∆mit + βo∆oit + uit,
where ∆eit is the growth rate of average yearly employment of firm i between
period t−1 and t, and ∆mit and ∆oit are, respectively, the growth rate of domes-
tically purchased inputs and total offshoring (i.e. goods and services together).
Similarly, we estimate a model with ∆mit on the left-hand side (LHS) and ∆eit on
the right-hand side (RHS). Each of these two specifications is estimated a second
time by adding ∆qit as a control variable. This exercise, exploratory in nature,
is aimed at understanding the strength of complementarity and substitutability
between offshoring, on one side, and labour and national intermediary inputs, on
the other side.
Two interesting facts emerge from the estimates reported in Table 3. When
we do not control for real output growth ∆q, we find a positive relationship
between the growth of offshoring and growth of employment, while we find a
negative relationship between the growth of national inputs and offshoring. Once
we include ∆q on the RHS, we uncover a negative relationship between ∆e and ∆o
in the services sector but not in the manufacturing sector. The point estimate for
the services sector is, however, very small in absolute value. Overall, these findings
suggest that most of the offshoring involves looking abroad for new suppliers of
goods and services previously bought on national markets, rather than the (much
feared) relocation of parts of the production process to low-income countries. This
is also consistent with the fact that in Belgium (as in other European countries),
most of the trading of goods and services is within the EU.
A. Main Results
We now turn to the main results obtained from estimating equations (3) and
(4). As explained in the empirical section, all specifications include firm fixed
effects and a number of control variables, such as (growth rates and lagged levels
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of) labour productivity, capital intensity and the wage rate. 19 The lagged level
of dependent variable is also included on the RHS to control for potential mean
reversion in firm employment growth.20 Hereafter, we first discuss the results for
total employment and then those for different levels of education.
Total Employment. — Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for the man-
ufacturing sector on the left panel and for the services sector on the right panel.
In each case, we first show the firm fixed effect (FE) results and then the FE-IV
results, where we instrument for the four offshoring variables.
The diagnostics for the IV specifications show that the Kleibergen-Paap test
statistic of weak instruments (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) strongly rejects the
null of underidentification in all specifications.21 At the same time, the p−values
of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions support the idea that instru-
ments are exogenous for the service sector.22 For the manufacturing industries,
there appears to be a problem with the exogeneity of the instruments for the
specification that include the control for output Qit. We note that in the check
of robustness reported at the end of this section, we obtain a Hansen p-value of
0.14 when using data for the period 1998-2005 (cf column (6) in Table 9).23.
In the manufacturing sector, when we do not control for output growth nor we
instrument for the offshoring variables, both the change in goods offshoring and
the lagged level of goods offshoring are positively related to employment growth
19The coefficients of most of the control variables (not reported in the tables but available upon
request) take the expected signs and are very precisely estimated. For instance, the coefficients on
growth and the lagged level of the hourly wage are both negative and significant at the 1 per cent level.
20See, for example, Sutton (1997) for a survey on the relation between firm size and employment
growth.
21Similarly, the Angrist and Pischke (2009) F-test of weak and underidentification (not reported but
available upon request), strongly rejects underidentification of each single endogenous variable, with
p-values below 0.001 in all the specifications presented in this Section.
22The endogeneity test is calculated as the difference between the Hansen statistic for the regression
where the offshoring variables are treated as endogenous and the Hansen statistic where they are assumed
to be exogenous. This difference has a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
variables tested for exogeneity. Under homoskedasticity, this test is numerically equal to a Hausman test
statistic. Baum et al. (2007)
23More generally, we note that, by changing the combination of instruments, we can obtain higher
p-values of the Hansen test with no major changes in the point estimates of our offshoring variables.
We believe that it is cleaner to use the same set of instruments across all specifications, even if in few
instances, we get low Hansen p-value
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while we do not find any significant effect of service offshoring on employment
growth. The coefficients on SOgit−1 and on ∆SO
g
it−1 are not statistically different.
As mentioned before, the estimated effects of offshoring are a combination of a
scale effect and a technology effect. The scale effect could stem from imports
of intermediate products increasing firm-level productivity because of learning,
variety or quality effects Amiti and Konings (2007), thus boosting competitive-
ness and increasing sales and, in turn, employment growth.24 The fact that the
coefficient for ∆SOgit is positive in column (1) but negative in column (2) sug-
gests that in the short-run, there is a certain degree of substitutability between
goods offshoring and labour, but this effect is more than offset by an expansion
in output.
Even after including the different controls and firm FE in the regression, there
could still be an endogeneity problem in the form of firms’ specific demand or
productivity shocks that increase simultaneously labour demand and the share
of imported intermediary inputs. We use IV regression to control for this endo-
geneity problem. The results in column (3) show that our IV strategy leads to
a drammatic increase in the point estimates for all offshoring variables: we now
find a large positive effect of both goods and services offshoring on employment.
The short-run coefficient on ∆SOgit−1 is significantly larger than the coefficient
on SOgit−1, a common feature across most of the specifications that will be pre-
sented in the rest of this Section. This result suggests that the positive effects of
offshoring are often halved when considering a longer period, possibly because of
the longer time required to adjust the labour force in Belgium. This interesting
finding confirms the importance of using an empirical framework that allows us
to assess the effect of offshoring at different points in time. Interestingly enough,
the two ”long-term” coefficients on the lagged offshoring variables are no longer
significant when we control for output growth. This is consistent with the idea
24Note that the increase in sales must be higher than the increase in imports to have an increase in
the share of offshoring.
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that the offshoring does not lead to a substitution of tasks previously performed
in-house; rather, it replaces domestic providers with suppliers located abroad.
The results for the services sector on the right panel show a more complex
picture. Similar to the manufacturing sector, an increase in the offshoring of
goods is related to an increase in employment, and this effect disappears when
we include controls for output growth. This, again, can be explained by ser-
vice firms replacing national intermediate goods with foreign goods that have a
better price/quality ratio. Offshoring of services is, instead, negatively related
to employment growth in the fixed effects specifications. When instrumenting
for the offshoring variables, we estimate a positive effect of ∆SOs on employment
growth, but this is a short-lived effect that disappears after one period, given that
the coefficient on lag offshoring is insignificant. The change in the coefficient for
∆SOs is consistent with the idea that firms face labour-saving technical changes
that, at the same time, facilitate offshoring of services. Finally, results in the
last column show that once we control for changes in output, service offshoring
makes firms in the service sector less labour intensive. However, it is important to
note that the size of the effect remains relatively small. For example, a firm that
would increase its share of service offshoring from 0 to the average 0.033, would
see a reduction in employment of around 1%, holding output fixed. This limited
effect of offshoring is mainly driven by the relatively low level of service offshoring
during our sample period (1996-2005). Over the last decade, services trade has
continued to grow at a fast pace. If the marginal effect of service offshoring on
employment growth has remained stable after our sample period, this implies that
the contribution of service offshoring to employment losses can be substantially
higher. However, the relation between service offshoring and employment could
as well have changed over the last decade, making it difficult to extrapolate our
findings to more recent years.
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Education level. — The fear of offshoring is not only driven by total job losses,
but also by concerns that offshoring favours one group of employees over the other,
based on their education/skill level. In this subsection, we look at the impact of
offshoring on low- and high-educated employees.
Tables 5 and 6 report the IV results for manufacturing and services, respectively.
The first two columns repeat the specification used in the previous section for the
sake of comparison.
Columns (3) and (5) in Table 5 shows that the positive effects of offshoring
on employment growth in the manufacturing sector are shared by low- and high-
skilled workers. Given our definition of the dependent variable as the change
in employment of a particular skill type divided by total employment, the coef-
ficient on the offshoring variable also varies with the importance of the labour
type in total employment. So, given that the fraction of low-skilled workers in
manufacturing industries is approximately four times as large as the fraction of
high-skilled workers, the coefficient on offshoring for the low-skilled should also
be four times as large as that for the high-skilled in order to keep the relative
shares of the different types at the same level. However, the coefficients for the
high-skilled are relatively larger when not controlling for output, indicating that
the firms are becoming more skill-intensive. This may explain why the only co-
efficient that it is marginally significant when controlling for output is for the
skilled workers in column (6).
The results for the services sector are included in Table 6. The positive ef-
fect of goods offshoring on employment growth when we do not condition on
output growth is shared by both low-educated and high-educated workers. For
service offshoring, the negative effect on employment is entirely due to high-skilled
employment. The results indicate that the offshored activities in Belgium are ex-
ecuted mainly by highly-educated employees. This is one of our key findings, as
it offers the first large-scale evidence using firm-level data that service offshoring
may threaten the job security of higher-educated workers. Given that the vast
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majority of imported services originate in other developed economies, the nega-
tive impact is not due to trading with low-wage countries. We will provide further
evidence on this issue in the next subsection.
B. Robustness Checks and Extensions
In this part, we check the robustness of the results when using a “narrow”
definition of offshoring and when reducing the sample period to 1998-2005.25.
Moreover we also explore whether the results above are driven by imports from
OECD or non-OECD countries.26
Transport Services Excluded/ Narrow Definition of Goods Offshoring. —
In the literature, there is a discussion of whether to define offshoring narrowly
or more broadly. 27 This rests on the idea that the closer the imported inputs
are to the outputs produced by the firm, the more likely it is that within-firm
labour could have produced those inputs. Moreover, up till now, we have included
transport services in out measure for service offshoring. However, especially for
the manufacturing sector, these are likely to relate strongly to exports of goods. In
Table 7, we show results for the manufacturing sector using a “narrow” definition
of goods offshoring and not including transport in service offshoring. Results are
very similar to those presented in the previous section; in particular, offshoring
of goods is confirmed to have a large positive impact on employment of all types
of workers, but for workers with low education, this effect disappears when we
control for output.
25As mentioned in the Data section, the threshold at which firms are asked to report intra-EU imports
and exports changed in 1998, so focusing on the 1998-2005 period can soften problems due to changes in
data reporting conditions.
26We have also experimented with alternative specifications, and obtained similar results, when: (i)
including a control for exports; (ii) adding an aggregate measure of import competition at industry-level;
and (iii) using only lagged offshoring instead of our richer dynamic framework.
27Note that if we were to apply the definition of “narrow” offshoring to services, the value of service
offshoring would be equal to zero for manufacturing firms.
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Core Services. — We apply similar ideas to the services sector and we repeat the
same analysis, but we now include only the core services–that is, the offshoring
of services that correspond to the main activity of the firm. Results reported in
Table 8 confirm the findings in Table 6, most notably the fact that it is only for
workers with a high level of education that (i) there is a negative overall effect of
offshoring (see the coefficient on SOsit−1 in column (5)); and (ii) there is a strong
substitution effect between labour and services offshoring when we control for
changes in output (see column(6)).
Period 1998-2005. — We re-estimate equations (3) and (4) using data for the
period 1998-2005 as in the first years of our data set the thresholds to report
trade data have changed. Moreover, the reporting of employment changed in
1996. Table 9 shows that results are very similar to those reported in Tables 5
and 6 above. The diagnostic tests for IV regressions confirm again that excluded
instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous offshoring variables; at the
same time, we now obtain higher p-values of the Hansen statistics, thus giving
further support to the validity of our IV strategy.
Including Origin of Imports. — Several empirical works have found that the
negative impact of goods offshoring on manufacturing sector employment is driven
by imports from developing countries–China in particular. For instance, Pierce
and Schott (2016) find: “Industries where the threat of tariff hikes declines the
most experience more severe employment losses along with larger increases in
the value of imports from China and the number of firms engaged in China-U.S.
trade.” In the present context, it is interesting to assess whether our two main
results (i.e., the positive effect of goods offshoring on employment for all types of
workers and the negative impact of services offshoring on highly-educated work-
ers) change according to the origin of the imported inputs. For this, we divide our
measure of offshoring intensity between offshoring from OECD countries and from
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non-OECD countries. Three interesting facts emerge from the results reported in
Table 10. First, imported goods from both OECD and non-OECD countries have
a positive impact on workers with low education, especially in the manufacturing
sectors, when not controlling for output growth. This finding suggests that for the
workforce in a particular firm, goods offshoring from developing countries does
not represent a threat. However, when controlling for output growth, offshoring
to non-OECD countries appears to have a long-term negative impact on employ-
ment growth, indicating that the production process becomes less labor intensive.
When distinguishing between low and high skilled workers, the coefficient remains
negative but becomes insignificant for both categories. Second, the positive im-
pact of goods offshoring on employees with high education is driven by imports
from OECD countries. This result is probably driven by the fact that the imports
from Western economies represent a better match with the skills of this group
of workers. Finally, the negative effect of services offshoring on higher-educated
workers is driven by trading with OECD countries.
V. Conclusion
The impact of globalisation on domestic labour markets has been the subject of
a large debate within the academic arena and among the general public. While the
focus has historically been on goods, offshoring of services has recently attracted
more and more interest because advances in information and communication tech-
nology have led to a remarkable increase in the tradability of services.
Using a newly constructed dataset that contains firm-level information on im-
ports of both goods and services, this study produces fresh evidence on the impact
of offshoring on the employment outcome in manufacturing industries and ser-
vices sectors. We deal with the standard endogeneity problem of offshoring by
constructing firm-level instrumental variables based on high-quality information
on exchange rates, inflation, wages and international trade flows. Diagnostic tests
presented in the empirical section show that our IVs are both highly correlated
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with offshoring and exogenous with respect to the possible demand and produc-
tivity shocks buried in the residual.
We find that employment growth of both workers with low and high education
is positively related to goods offshoring in the manufacturing sector. Our em-
pirical specification allows us to uncover a substantial reduction in this positive
impact over time, with a coefficient on lagged offshoring often halved compared
to the (short-run) effect in period t. Moreover, we find that this positive relation-
ship disappears when controlling for scale effects. For the services sectors, our
key finding is that there is a negative effect of service offshoring on the employ-
ment outcome of workers with higher education. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first large-scale study with detailed information on services offshoring
that showing that globalisation may threaten the job security of higher-educated
workers. We show that this result is driven by trading within OECD countries,
which is not unsurprising given that the vast majority of trade in services is with
these countries. This result contrasts the findings of previous studies, in which
trading from low-wage countries–China in particular, was the main culprit for the
loss of blue-collar jobs in the manufacturing industries.
The fact that service offshoring represents a small percentage of firms’ turnover
implies that its impact on the employment of higher-educated workers is not large
in the period we study. However, the nature of our findings are very important if
we take into consideration that service offshoring has grown at a faster pace than
goods offshoring in the last decade, a trend that may even increase given that
ongoing trade negotiations are increasingly focused on facilitating market access
in areas such as licensing, telecommunications, e-commerce and financial services.
A limitation of our work is that we only look at the effects of offshoring on
individual firms. To assess the aggregate impact of service offshoring, one would
need to take into account the impact on domestic suppliers and competitors,
which could experience employment losses and could be more likely to exit the
market. Determining these effects lies outside the scope of the current paper and
24
we leave this for future research.
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VII. Tables
Table 1—Imports of Different Service Types (values in million euros)
1996 2005
Type of Service Value Share % Firms Value Share %Firms
Transport Services 2,054 61.5% 13.6% 3,771 45.9% 14.8%
Business Services 788 23.6% 13.8% 2,411 29.4% 21.5%
IT Services 189 5.7% 5.6% 965 11.8% 8.2%
Communication Services 228 6.8% 2.0% 910 11.1% 2.8%
Financial Services 80 2.4% 11.2% 151 1.8% 12.2%
Total Trade in Services 3,339 100% 28.2% 8,208 100% 38.8%
Total Trade in Goods 29,766 57.2% 56,219 51.6%
Table 2—Summary Statistics
Variable Mean p50 sd Obs
Manufacturing
Turnover (×1000e) 44,932 11,377 181,515 24,489
Employment 153 56 424 24,489
Offshoring of Goods (×1000e) 13,309 1,654 88,390 24,489
Offshoring of Services (×1000e) 552 0 7,163 24,489
Share Offshoring Goods 0.194 0.145 0.189 24,489
Share Offshoring Services 0.005 0 0.021 24,489
Employment Growth 0.45% 0.0% 16.4% 24,489
Services
Turnover (×1000e) 21,744 5,184 117,440 20,161
Employment 156 27.1 1,389 20,161
Offshoring of Goods (×1000e) 450 0 6,385 20,161
Offshoring of Services (×1000e) 1,702 0 14,977 20,161
Share Offshoring Goods 0.013 0 0.067 20,161
Share Offshoring Services 0.033 0 0.077 20,161
Employment Growth 3.6% 1.7% 23.1% 20,161
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Table 5—Employment growth and offshoring in manufacturing sectors; Low
versus high educated
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE
ShOfgit−1 0.737*** 0.166 0.474*** 0.040 0.205*** 0.100*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
∆ShOfgit 1.383*** 0.347* 0.900*** 0.141 0.331*** 0.116
(0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10)
ShOf sit−1 0.616 0.059 0.285 -0.123 0.233 0.118
(0.38) (0.28) (0.28) (0.23) (0.15) (0.13)
∆ShOf sit 0.839** -0.078 0.157 -0.489* 0.436** 0.230
(0.42) (0.31) (0.32) (0.26) (0.17) (0.16)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 24489 24489 24489 24489 24489 24489
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .000 .220 .001 .418 .125 .836
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .558 .630 .6631428 .130 .186 .424
Underidentification .000 .000 .000 .000 0 0.00E+00
Endog. Test .000 0.245 .000 .341 0 0.050
Hansen p−val .539 .053 .411 .113 .157 0.041
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital
intensity. The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in the
specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the
control variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth. The same holds for
controlling for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in the
same way as offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Table 6—Employment growth and offshoring in services sectors; Low versus
high educated
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE
ShOfgit−1 1.451*** 0.285 0.590*** -0.012 0.635*** 0.174
(0.26) (0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
∆ShOfgit 1.638*** 0.117 0.693** -0.118 0.773*** 0.176
(0.43) (0.35) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24)
ShOf sit−1 0.033 -0.281** 0.237** 0.075 -0.194** -0.321***
(0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
∆ShOf sit 0.435** -0.286* 0.255* -0.110 0.072 -0.210**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 20161 20161 20161 20161 20161 20161
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .608 .575 .690 .655 .530 .992
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .016 .972 .881 .085 .010 .235
Underidentification .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Endog. Test .000 .257 .001 .695 .000 .036
Hansen p−val .411 .663 .726 .569 .560 .904
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital intensity.
The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in the
specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the control
variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth.The same holds for controlling
for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in the same way as
offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Table 7—Employment growth and offshoring in manufacturing sectors; Nar-
row goods offshoring and service offshoring without transport services
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE
ShOfgit−1 1.355*** 0.382 0.864*** 0.144 0.389*** 0.214*
(0.26) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.12)
∆ShOfgit 4.076*** 1.195** 2.600*** 0.523 0.995*** 0.413
((0.68) (0.57) (0.51) (0.48) (0.29) (0.29)
ShOf sit−1 1.273 0.159 0.547 -0.238 0.530* 0.290
(0.78) (0.48) (0.55) (0.38) (0.28) (0.23)
∆ShOf sit 2.282*** 0.207 0.814 -0.661 1.000*** 0.530**
(0.85) (0.53) (0.61) (0.42) (0.31) (0.26)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 24518 24518 24518 24518 24518 24518
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .000 .093 .000 .348 .022 .436
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .183 .921 .627 .288 .085 .303
Underidentification .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Endog. Test .000 .139 .000 .225 .000 .040
Hansen p−val .350 .109 .232 .134 .288 .076
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital
intensity. The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in
the specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the
control variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth.The same holds for
controlling for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in
the same way as offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as
well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Table 8—Employment growth and offshoring in services sectors; offshoring of
core services
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE
ShOfgit−1 1.405*** 0.269 0.561*** -0.025 0.626*** 0.175
(0.25) (0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
∆ShOfgit 1.613*** 0.100 0.642** -0.165 0.794*** 0.198
(0.42) (0.35) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24)
ShOf sit−1 Core 0.048 -0.537** 0.431** 0.130 -0.359* -0.598***
(0.30) (0.23) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
∆ShOf sit Core 1.190*** -0.613* 0.634** -0.284 0.277 -0.429*
(0.46) (0.36) (0.32) (0.29) (0.28) (0.26)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .556 .560 .749 .545 .433 .908
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .005 .815 .478 .116 .011 .457
Underidentification .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Endog. Test .000 .185 .003 .703 .000 .025
Hansen p−val .481 .655 .728 .574 .631 .899
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital intensity.
The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in the
specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the control
variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth.The same holds for controlling
for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in the same way as
offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Appendices
A. Classification of Services
Table A.1 lists the types of services and the corresponding NACE code. The
table further aggregates services into seven categories: Transport, Financial and
Insurance, Construction, IT Business and Cultural Services.
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Table A.1—International trade of services: Classification of services
Rub EBOPS Description of service in services trade database NACE 1.1 EU KLEMS Category
100 207 Transportation - Sea transport - Passenger
61 60t63
Transport
101 208 Transportation - Sea transport - Freight
102 209 Transportation - Sea transport - Other
110 211 Transportation - Air transport - Passenger
62 60t63111 212 Transportation - Air transport - Freight
112 213 Transportation - Air transport - Other
120 215 Transportation - Other transport - Passenger
60 + 63 60t63121 216 Transportation - Other transport - Freight
122 217 Transportation - Other transport - Other
130 260 Financial services
65t67 J Financial/Insurance
131 260 Financial services
142 246 Communication services - Postal and courier services
64 64 Communication143 246 Communication services - Postal and courier services
144 247 Communication services - Telecommunication services
156 249 Construction Services 45 F Construction
162 263 Computer and information services - Computer services
72 71t74 IT
163 264 Computer and information services - Information services
180 271 Insurance services - Other direct insurance
65t67 J Financial/Insurance
181 256 Insurance services - Life insurance and pension funding
182 254 Insurance services - Freight insurance
183 255 Insurance services - Reinsurance
184 257 Insurance services - Auxiliary services
190 258 Other business services - Research and development 73 71t74
Business services
191 274 Other business services - Miscellaneous business, professional and
technical services - Legal, accounting, management, consulting and
public relations
74 71t74
193 280 Other business services - Miscellaneous business, professional and
technical services - Architectural, engineering and other technical
services
194 278 Other business services - Miscellaneous business, professional and
technical services - Advertising, market research, and public opin-
ion polling
195 283 Other business services - Miscellaneous business, professional and
technical services - Agricutltural, mining and on-site processing
services - Other
196 282 Other business services - Miscellaneous business, professional and
technical services - Agricutltural, mining and on-site processing
services -Waste treatment and depollution
199 284 Other business services - Miscellaneous business, professional and
technical services - Other
231 288 Personal, cultural and recreational services: Audiovisual and re-
lated services
92 O Cultural
239 289 Personal, cultural and recreational services: Other personal, cul-
tural and recreational activities
247 DROPPED from data, does not exist in classification -
270 272 Other business services - Operational leasing services 71 71t74 Business services
a Column ”Rub” lists the services codes appearing in the Belgian data. The column ”EBOPS” lists the
corresponding (international) EBOPS code for that service. The column ”NACE Rev 1.1” lists the
corresponding NACE sector for each service, while the column ”EU KLEMS” assigns a NACE sector
code that features in the EU KLEMS data (sometimes these sectors are more aggregated than the
original NACE codes. The final column ”Service category” shows the groupings applied in the data. We
consider these services categories separately in the data. All services except ”Transport” are ”producer
services”, we have already excluded e.g. travel services from the data prior to assigning service
categories.
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B. Summaries Evolution Trade in Goods and Services
Table B.1 displays services imports and exports for the years 1995 and 2005.
The total value of service imports surged from 8.5 billion euros in 1995 to 20
billion euros in 2005, an increase of over 130%. Service exports increased by
145%, from 10 billion euros to 24 billion euros. Transport services are the largest
category, followed by Business Services and Financial Services. The rankings of
the different service types are similar for imports and exports, consistent with
models of intra-industry trade and product differentiation. Growth in Transport
Services follows the trend in goods trade more closely and decreases in relative
importance over the sample period. International trade in Business, ICT and
Communication Services boomed particularly between 1995 and 2005.
The last row in Table B.1 displays total imports and exports of goods in 1995
and 2005. While the increase in Service Trade was more pronounced over the
period, the value of total trade in services was only 10% of the value of total trade
in goods in 2005. Table B.2 makes a comparison between the top destination
countries/countries of origin for exports and imports of goods versus services.
Trade in goods is dominated by trade with the three neighbouring countries (The
Netherlands, Germany and France), accounting for over 40% of total trade in
goods. For trade in services, the United Kingdom tops the ranking of the countries
of destination/origin and the US ranks second for exports. This is consistent with
the findings of Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011) that the US and the UK are more
important trading partners for services than for goods trade.
Table B.1—International Trade in Goods and Services, 1995-2005
Imports Exports
1995 2005 Change 1995 2005 Change
Value Share Value Share 95-05 Value Share Value Share 95-05
Transport Services 4,628 53.4% 8,802 44.1% +90.2% 5,639 56.5% 9,922 40.7% +75.9%
Business Services 1,604 18.5% 5,692 28.5% +254.8% 1,645 16.5% 6,214 25.5% +277.8%
Financial/Insurance Services 1,112 12.8% 1,929 9.7% +73.4% 1,122 11.2% 2,800 11.5% +149.5%
Construction Services 442 5.1% 636 3.2% +43.8% 410 4.1% 1,439 5.9% +251.3%
IT Services 398 4.6% 1,476 7.4% +271.2% 656 6.6% 1,975 8.1% +201.0%
Communication Services 238 2.7% 1,048 5.3% +340.8% 418 4.2% 1,644 6.7% +293.3%
Cultural Services 237 2.7% 370 1.9% +55.7% 86 0.9% 411 1.7% +376.2%
Total Trade in Serices 8,659 100.0% 19,952 100% +130.4% 9,977 100.0% 24,406 100.0% +144.6%
Trade in Goods 99,740 214,540 +115.0% 110,352 224,976 +103.9%
Values in Million Euros. Full sample from international trade in services and international trade in goods databases.
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Table B.2—Countries of Origin/Destination and Trade in Services/Goods
Services
Imports Exports
Top Countries Value Share Top Countries Value Share
United Kingdom 3,226 16.2% United Kingdom 4,260 17.5%
France 2,502 12.5% USA 4,147 17.0%
The Netherlands 2,479 12.4% The Netherlands 3,600 14.7%
USA 2,311 11.6% France 2,888 11.8%
Germany 2,212 11.1% Germany 2,706 11.1%
Italy 870 4.4% Luxembourg 1,136 4.7%
Switzerland 726 3.6% Switzerland 730 3.0%
Spain 574 2.9% Sweden 487 2.0%
Luxembourg 522 2.6% Italy 455 1.9%
Hong Kong 403 2.0% Spain 351 1.4%
Goods
Imports Exports
Top Countries Value Share Top Countries Value Share
The Netherlands 51,272 20.5% Germany 42,383 16.1%
Germany 35,918 14.3% France 40,669 15.5%
France 27,457 11.0% The Netherlands 32,798 12.5%
USA 14,362 5.7% United Kingdom 19,186 7.3%
United Kingdom 14,356 5.7% USA 15,599 5.9%
Ireland 14,254 5.7% Italy 12,107 4.6%
China 8,035 3.2% Spain 8,313 3.2%
Italy 6,987 2.8% India 6,661 2.5%
Japan 5,942 2.4% Luxembourg 4,973 1.8%
Russia 5,935 2.4% Poland 4,479 1.7%
Values in Million Euros. Services data are from 2005. Goods data are from 2010
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C. Fixed Effects Results
Table C.1—Employment growth and offshoring in manufacturing sectors; Low
versus high educated; Fixed Effects
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
ShOfgit−1 0.111*** -0.033 0.088*** -0.016 0.022** -0.009
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ShOfgit 0.084*** -0.069*** 0.074*** -0.034* 0.007 -0.028***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ShOf sit−1 0.070 0.050 0.118 0.103 -0.074 -0.078
(0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ShOf sit 0.025 0.020 -0.023 -0.027 0.023 0.023
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 24489 24489 24489 24489 24489 24489
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .184 .060 .368 .241 .121 .044
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .634 .747 .051 .047 .028 .028
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital intensity.
The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in the
specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the control
variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth. The same holds for controlling
for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in the same way as
offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Table C.2—Employment growth and offshoring in services sectors; Low versus high
educated; Fixed Effects
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
ShOfgit−1 0.134* -0.038 0.111** 0.023 0.026 -0.042
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ShOfgit 0.188*** -0.032 0.106** -0.007 0.092** 0.005
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
ShOf sit−1 -0.100** -0.098*** -0.015 -0.015 -0.082*** -0.082***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ShOf sit -0.120*** -0.144*** -0.056* -0.068** -0.062** -0.071***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 20161 20161 20161 20161 20161 20161
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .329 .900 .907 .407 .041 .139
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .633 .207 .173 .056 .442 .670
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital intensity.
The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in the specification
where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the control variables also
enter in both lagged levels and growth. The same holds for controlling for output. If
the specification controls for output, output enters in the same way as offshoring.
Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Table C.3—Employment growth and offshoring in manufacturing sectors; Nar-
row Offshoring of Goods and Services Offshoring Excludes Transport Ser-
vices; Fixed Effects
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
ShOfgit−1 0.062* -0.077*** 0.048** -0.053** 0.016 -0.013
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ShOfgit 0.037 -0.152*** 0.053* -0.080*** -0.008 -0.051***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
ShOf sit−1 -0.042 0.086 0.069 0.160* -0.136 -0.107
(0.16) (0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
∆ShOf sit 0.078 0.162 -0.002 0.056 0.024 0.043
(0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 24518 24518 24518 24518 24518 24518
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .445 .010 .854 .244 .106 .007
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .308 .551 .407 .225 .022 .038
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital
intensity. The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in
the specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the
control variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth. The same holds for
controlling for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in the
same way as offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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Table C.4—Employment growth and offshoring in services sectors; Core Ser-
vices; Fixed Effects
Total Low Skilled High Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
ShOfgit−1 0.121* -0.039 0.105** 0.023 0.021 -0.042
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ShOfgit 0.184*** -0.035 0.105** -0.007 0.088** 0.002
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ShOf sit−1 Core -0.110 -0.127** 0.005 -0.004 -0.099** -0.106***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
∆ShOf sit Core -0.072 -0.152** -0.062 -0.103** -0.017 -0.049
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Controls for Output X X X
Obs 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275
ShOfgit−1 = ∆ShOf
g
it .262 .928 .999 .405 .033 .154
ShOf sit−1 = ∆ShOf
s
it .586 .664 .170 .028 .069 .166
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
b All specifications include controls for wages, labor productivity and capital intensity.
The controls enter in the same way as the offshoring variables, i.e. in the
specification where offshoring enters in lagged levels as well as in growth, the control
variables also enter in both lagged levels and growth. The same holds for controlling
for output. If the specification controls for output, output enters in the same way as
offshoring. Finally, the lagged level of employment is included as well.
c All specifications include firm fixed effects.
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